Abstract. The stream ciphers Py, Pypy and Py6 were designed by Biham and Seberry for the ECRYPT-eSTREAM project in 2005. The ciphers were promoted to the 'Focus' ciphers of the Phase II of the eSTREAM project. However, due to some cryptanalytic results on the ciphers, strengthened versions of the ciphers, namely TPy, TPypy and TPy6 were built. So far there exists no attacks on TPy6. In this paper, we find hitherto unknown weaknesses in the keystream generation algorithms of the Py6 and of its stronger variant TPy6. Exploiting these weaknesses, a large number of distinguishing attacks are mounted on the ciphers, the best of which works with 2 224.6 data and comparable time. In the second part, we present two new ciphers derived from the TPy6, namely TPy6-A and TPy6-B, whose performances are 2.65 cycles/byte and 4.4 cycles/byte on Pentium III. As a result, to the best of our knowledge, on Pentium platforms TPy6-A becomes the fastest stream cipher in the literature. Based on our security analysis, we conjecture that no attacks better than brute force are possible on the ciphers TPy6-A and TPy6-B.
data and comparable time [11] .
-August 2007 (presented at SAC 2007 2 Notation and Convention -The mth bit (m = 0 denotes the least significant bit or lsb) of the first output-word generated at round n is denoted by O n(m) . The second output-word is not used anywhere in our analysis. -P n , Y n+1 and s n are the inputs to the algorithm at round n. When this convention is followed, we see that O n = (ROT L32(s n , 25) ⊕ Y n [64]) + Y n [P n [26] ]-the index 'n' is maintained throughout the expression. -The ROT L32(x, k) denotes that the variable x is cyclically rotated to the left by k bits. -The operators '+' and '−' denote addition modulo 2 32 and subtraction modulo 2 32 respectively, except when used with expressions which relate two elements of array P . In this case they denote addition and subtraction over Z.
-The symbol '⊕' denotes bitwise exclusive-or and denotes set intersection.
-The pseudorandom bit generation algorithm of a stream cipher is denoted by PRBG.
Distinguishing attacks on the Py6 and the TPy6
We detect a large number of input-output correlations of TPy6 and Py6 that allow us to build distinguishers. The weak states which lead to the best distinguishing attack are outlined in the following theorem. 
If j = i − 25 mod 32, then (7) becomes
Substituting (8) in (4), we get,
Next, we have
where e 7 is the carry term in (10) . Substituting (11) in (9), we get,
Now, if k = −11 (i.e., k ≡ −11 mod 32 ⇒ P 
By similar arguments, when
From (9), we get
When k = 0 (i.e., P 1 [26] ≡ −18 mod 32), the above equation reduces to
Similarly, when P 3 [26] ≡ −4 mod 32, we have
From (13) and (14), we derive the following results:
This completes the proof.
Now we state the second lemma.
if the following conditions are simultaneously satisfied, Table 1 .
, given the events E1 to E7 simultaneously occur (the terms are grouped by their bit positions)
Proof. Equation (5) gives us:
The first condition (P 1 [26] ≡ −18 mod 32) reduces this to
Therefore, Finally, with condition 2 (i.e., P 2 [26] ≡ 7 mod 32), the previous equation becomes
This completes the proof. Now we observe that, when the conditions listed under (i) Lemma 1 (i.e., events E 1 , E 3 , E 4 and E 5 ) and (ii) Lemma 2 (i.e., events E 1 , E 2 , E 6 and E 7 ) are simultaneously satisfied, then the expression
is the XOR of the terms which are listed in Table 1 (grouped according to the bit positions).
2 Similarly, the 'carries' in Table 1 are elaborated in Table 2 . Table 2 . Carry terms generated in
If the Y -terms in Table 1 are pairwise equated (this is achieved when the events E 8 through to E 16 occur) then we get
Now, when the RHS of (21) equals zero (i.e., E 17 occurs) we get
Computation of the Bias
In this section, we quantify the bias in the outputs of TPy6 (and hence Py6) induced by the fortuitous events similar to the one described in Sect. 3. Now it is important to note that there may be more than one set of 17 conditions possible, where each of them results in O 1(i) ⊕O 3(i+7) ⊕O 7(i+7) ⊕O 8(i+7) = 0 (let us assume that there are n such sets). In Theorem 1, we listed one such set. Our experiments suggest that these n sets are mutually independent, however, a formal proof of that is nontrivial. Each of the events E 1 to E 5 occurs with approximate probability 1 32 and each of the events E 6 to E 16 occurs with probability which is approximately 1 64 . Let p denote the probability that condition 17 is satisfied. Let F denote the event 16 j=1 E j . Therefore,
2 Note that none of the terms listed in Table 1 is of the form A c because we used the fact that A c ⊕B c = A⊕B in (16), (17), (18) and (19).
We
From Table 1 , we get the maximum number of ways that terms of a particular column can be pairwise equated and hence the upper bound on n can be calculated to be 2 · 2 · 945 = 3780, that is, n < 3780.
Formulating the Bias
Now, we establish a formula to compute
, under the assumption of a perfectly random key/IV setup and the uniformity of bits when F n does not occur.Our experiments suggest that it is infeasible to find a set of conditions such that the overall bias (computed on the basis of the aforementioned assumption of randomness in the event that F n does not occur) is canceled or reduced in magnitude. Therefore, this assumption is reasonable. Let T denote
. Then using Bayes' rule we get
Hence, we see that the distribution of the outputs (
The bias is equal to n · (2p − 1) · 1 2 92 . In the following section, we provide formulas to compute p, i.e., the probability that E 17 occurs; or more generally, the probability that the 17th condition of each of the n F -like events occurs, i.e., P [d
Biases in the Carry Terms
In this section, we provide formulas to calculate the bias in the carry terms. The carry terms c and e are generated in expressions of the form (S ⊕ X) + Z. We now proceed to calculate P [c l(i) = 0] assuming that S, X and Z are uniformly distributed and independent. Under this assumption,
, that is, the probability that the carry bit at position i equals zero depends only on i. Stated otherwise, P [c (i) 
Since there is no carry on the lsb, p 0 = 1. We now have Table 3 .
From Table 3 , using Bayes' rule we get
Solving this recursion, given p 0 = 1, we get Now, the carry terms f and g are generated in expressions of the form S + X − Z. This can be rewritten as S + X + Z c + 1 since the additions in these two expressions are modulo 2 32 . The presence of two carries in S + X + Z is demonstrated using the Figure 2 . The carries generated in S + X + Z c + 1 can be thought of as carries generated in S + X + A where A = Z c and the carries on the lsb f (0) = 1, g (0) = 0. Let q i denote P [f (i) = 0] and r i denote P [g (i) = 0]. Hence, q 0 = 0, r 0 = 1 and r 1 = 1. Now we have Table 4 .
From Table 4 , using Bayes' rule we get
Using the initial conditions, q 0 = 0, r 0 = 1 and r 1 = 1, q i and r i are computed recursively. Since 
2 (i+7 mod 32)+1 . Using the above formulas, the value of p can be computed for any given i. Running simulation, we find that the maximum bias in the chosen outputs occurs when i = 25 which corresponds to p = 0.5 − 2 −34.2 . Hence, (22) gives us
2 , when i = 25. Substituting n = 3780 in the above equation, we get:
This is an upper bound on the probability that the outputs (
) of TPy6 (and hence Py6) are biased. From Sect. 3, we found that n ≥ 1. From the previous discussion, we see that n < 3780. Hence, 1 ≤ n < 3780. If n = 1, then
(27)
The Distinguisher
A distinguisher is an algorithm which distinguishes a given stream of bits from a stream of bits generated by a perfect PRBG. The distinguisher is constructed by collecting sufficiently many outputs
) generated by as many key/IVs. To compute the minimum number of samples required to establish the distinguisher, we use the following corollary of a theorem from [7] .
Corollary 1.
If an event e occurs in a distribution X with probability p and in Y with probability p(1 + q) then, if p = 2 ) = O(2 224.6 ) output samples are needed to construct the best distinguisher with a non-negligible probability of success.
A Family of Distinguishers
In Sect. 3 we found that the outputs at rounds 1, 3, 7 and 8 are biased allowing us to build a distinguisher. It is found that there exist plenty of 4-tuples of biased outputs. The generalization is presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The distribution of the outputs (O
) of the TPy6 are biased for many suitably chosen (r, t, u)'s where r > 0; t, u ≥ 5; t ∈ {r, r + 2, u}; u ∈ {r, r + 2, t}.
We omit the proof as it is similar to the proof furnished for Theorem 1. This allows us to construct a family of distinguishers for the cipher TPy6. It seems possible to combine these huge number of distinguishers in order to construct one single efficient distinguisher; however, any concrete mathematical model to combine them is still an interesting open problem. Another major implication of the above generalization theorem is the fact that the TPy6 outputs will remain always biased no matter how many initial outputwords are discarded from the keystream.
7 Two New Ciphers: TPy6-A and TPy6-B
The Py-family of stream ciphers has been subject to extensive analysis ever since Py and Py6 were proposed in April 2005. The impressive speeds of the ciphers in software, particularly the Py6 and the TPy6, have motivated us to modify the TPy6 to rule out all the attacks described in the previous sections of the paper. Firstly, many attacks on the Py, in particular, [5] , [8] , [9] and [15] can be easily translated to attacks on the Py6. However, due to smaller internal state of the TPy6, the attack described in [11] does not apply to TPy6. Secondly, the speed of execution of Py6 on Pentium-III is about 2.82 cycles/byte which is very fast. These observations make TPy6 and Py6 more favorable to be used as fast stream ciphers than Py. The TPy6 is resistant to the attacks described in [8] , [15] . In order to generate a fast and secure stream cipher, we redesign the TPy6 where the variable rotation of a 32-bit term s in the round function is replaced by a constant, non-zero rotation term. The resultant cipher is named TPy6-A. It is shown that this tweak clearly reduces one addition operation in each round (thereby, the performance is improved) and makes the cipher secure against all the existing attacks on Py6 and TPy6. A relatively slower version, where one outputword is removed from each round of TPy6, is also proposed. The speeds of execution of the TPy6-A and TPy6-B on Pentium-III are 2.65 cycles/byte and 4.4 cycles/byte. Our security analysis conjectures that the TPy6-A and TPy6-B are immune to all attacks better than brute force. Algorithm 2 describes the PRBGs of the TPy6-A and TPy6-B. Note that the key/IV setup algorithms of the ciphers are identical to the key/IV setup of TPy6.
Algorithm 2 Round functions of TPy6-A and TPy6-B condition 1 is common to all the n sets (1 ≤ n < 3780) of conditions (see Sect. 4) and hence its violation nullifies the attack.
In Appendix A, we elaborate more on the usefulness of selection of constant rotation to eliminate any distinguishing attacks on the new ciphers.
(ii) Resistance to Differential attacks: Wu and Preneel found weaknesses in the IV setups of the Py6 [15] . Exploiting these weaknesses, it is possible to recover some key-dependent information. The cipher TPy6 was specifically designed to rule out these weaknesses. Since the IV setup algorithms of the TPy6-A and the TPy6-B are identical with that of TPy6, these attacks are no longer applicable to the new ciphers.
(iii) Resistance to Algebraic attacks and Guess-and-Determine Attacks: TPy6-A and TPy6-B are array-based stream ciphers. The sizes of the internal states of TPy6-A and TPy6-B are 2,720 bits each, which is quite large. Hence, it appears infeasible to mount algebraic attacks that are otherwise common against LFSR-based stream ciphers which have low footprints. From our experiments, we expect that the TPy6-A and TPy6-B are also secure against guess-and-determine attacks.
Conclusions and Open Problems
The first contribution of the paper is the development of a family of distinguishers from the outputs at rounds r, r + 2, t and u of the cipher TPy6 (and Py6), where r > 0; t, u ≥ 5; t ∈ {r, r + 2, u}; u ∈ {r, r + 2, t}. The best distinguisher works with data complexity 2 224.6 . It is reasonable to assume that these weak states can be combined to mount a more efficient attack on TPy; however, methods to combine many distinguishers into a single yet more efficient one is still an open problem. The second contribution is a proposal of two new, extremely fast stream ciphers TPy6-A and TPy6-B, which rule out all the existing attacks on the TPy6 and are conjectured to be immune to all attacks better than brute force.
